This collection of essays on themes in the work of John Locke , George Berkeley , and David Hume , provides a deepened understanding of major issues raised in the Empiricist tradition. In exploring their shared belief in the experiential nature of mental constructs, The Empiricists illuminates the different methodologies of these great Enlightenment philosophers and introduces students to important metaphysical and epistemological issues including the theory of ideas, personal identity, and skepticism. It will be especially useful in courses devoted (...) to the history of modern philosophy. (shrink)

The author maintains that there is no special problem about the verification or analysis of counterfactual or unfulfilled conditional statements. there is no special problem about the verification or analysis of subjunctive conditionals. it exhausts the peculiar philosophical interest of these two classes of statement to explain why no philosopher ought to think them peculiarly interesting, and to explain why so many do. the author states that it should not be supposed that if he achieves his aim, all the difficulties (...) and disputes which have occurred in discussions supposed to be about counterfactual or subjunctive conditionals will be settled in his article. this is because many of these difficulties have arisen, not out of features peculiar to either of these classes of statement, but out of features common to all conditional statements. (staff). (shrink)

There is an ancient and ambiguous philosophical doctrine that perception is passive. This can mean that the mind contributes nothing to the content of our sensory experience: its power of perception is a mere receptivity. In this sense the principle has often been questioned, and is indeed doubtful on empirical grounds, given one reasonable interpretation of what it would be for the mind to make such a contribution.

There is an ancient and ambiguous philosophical doctrine that perception is passive. This can mean that the mind contributes nothing to the content of our sensory experience: its power of perception is a mere receptivity. In this sense the principle has often been questioned, and is indeed doubtful on empirical grounds, given one reasonable interpretation of what it would be for the mind to make such a contribution.

Ever since its first publication critics of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason have been struck by certain strong formal resemblances between transcendental idealism and Berkeley's immaterialism. Both philosophers hold that the sensible world is mind-dependent, and that from this very mind-dependence we can draw a refutation of scepticism of the senses.

Ever since its first publication critics of Kant'sCritique of Pure Reasonhave been struck by certain strong formal resemblances between transcendental idealism and Berkeley's immaterialism. Both philosophers hold that the sensible world is mind-dependent, and that from this very mind-dependence we can draw a refutation of scepticism of the senses.

PROBLEMS FROM LOCKE by J. L. Mackie. Clarendon Press: O.U.P., 1976. ix+237 pp. £6 cloth, £2.50 paper.

M. R. Ayers; V*—Some Thoughts, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 73, Issue 1, 1 June 1973, Pages 69–86, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/73.1.

Anthony Quinton's The Nature of Things covers competently a good deal of philosophical ground in hopeful pursuit of a coherent ontology de-scribable as ‘a version of materialism’. He seems to discern two major difficulties for the enterprise: first, that of giving an acceptable account of ontology, and, secondly, that of reconciling his naturalism with his empiricist principles. ‘Naturalism’ is the view that man and his doings constitute a part of nature on the same ontological level as other natural things, and (...) materialism is a naturalist philosophy. Of the second difficulty Quinton writes:…a naturalistic view of the world has had to find its chief philosophical expression through doctrines of a sceptical and subjectivist kind, such as Hume's, which have a tendency to undermine the naturalistic presumptions which inspired them. In this book I have tried to equip materialism with solid philosophical credentials. (shrink)

M. R. Ayers; V*—Some Thoughts, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 73, Issue 1, 1 June 1973, Pages 69–86, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/73.1.